the Amazon or the Nile?) or prediction problems (e.g., The overconfidence observed in calibration studies Who will win the election, the incumbent or the chalhas recently been questioned on both psychological lenger?). For each question, subjects select one of the and methodological grounds. In the first part of the two answers and assess the probability that their anarticle we discuss these issues and argue that overcon-swer is correct. A judge is said to be calibrated if his fidence cannot be explained as a selection bias, and or her probability judgments match the corresponding that it is not eliminated by random sampling of ques-relative frequency of occurrence. Specifically, among all tions. In the second part of the article, we compare answers to which the judge assigns a given probability probability judgments for single events with judg-(say, 75%), the judge is calibrated if 75% of these an- Phillips, 1982; McClelland & Bolger, 1994; Yates, 1990). given personality profile. Judgments of confidence and Overconfidence is common, but not universal; it is typiestimates of relative frequency were practically indis-cally eliminated and even reversed for easy questions tinguishable; both exhibited substantial overconfi- (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977) . This phenomenon, dence and were highly correlated with independent called the difficulty effect (or the hard-easy effect), is judgments of representativeness. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
tions. In the second part of the article, we compare answers to which the judge assigns a given probability probability judgments for single events with judg-(say, 75%), the judge is calibrated if 75% of these anments of relative frequency. Subjects received a target swers are in fact correct.
individual's personality profile and then predicted the target's responses to a series of binary questions. One
Studies of calibration have shown that people's configroup predicted the responses of an individual target, dence often exceeds their accuracy. (For reviews of the while a second group estimated the relative frequency literature, see Keren, 1991; of responses among all target subjects who shared a Phillips, 1982; McClelland & Bolger, 1994; Yates, 1990) . given personality profile. Judgments of confidence and Overconfidence is common, but not universal; it is typiestimates of relative frequency were practically indis-cally eliminated and even reversed for easy questions tinguishable; both exhibited substantial overconfi- (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977) . This phenomenon, dence and were highly correlated with independent called the difficulty effect (or the hard-easy effect), is judgments of representativeness. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
hardly surprising. Because overconfidence is defined as the difference between mean confidence and overall accuracy, we expect a negative correlation between overconStudies of judgment under uncertainty have indicated that people are often overconfident. Overconfi-fidence and accuracy on purely statistical grounds.
The overconfidence observed in calibration studies dence is manifested in various forms, such as nonregressive prediction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) and has recently been questioned on both psychological and methodological grounds. We first discuss these objecoverly-narrow confidence intervals (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982) , but much of the evidence for overconfidence tions, and then investigate alternative interpretations of overconfidence by comparing assessments of unique comes from calibration studies. In a typical calibration experiment, subjects are presented with a series of gen-events with estimates of relative frequencies. eral knowledge questions (e.g., Which river is longer, difficult or surprising items could lead to spurious over-ceed 65% exhibited overconfidence (mean Å 7%), and all four data sets in which accuracy exceeds 78% exhibconfidence. Consider, for example, the question, ''Which ited underconfidence (mean Å 5%), contrary to the first city is further north: Rome or New York?'' Although there prediction of PMM. These data also provide strong eviis nothing deceptive or misleading about this question, dence against the second prediction of PMM that for most people find the correct answer (Rome) quite surprisrepresentative samples of items the correlation being. Questions like this, in fact, may be highly diagnostic tween confidence and accuracy will be zero. In contrast, of knowledge of geography, but the inclusion of many the correlation, across data sets, between the degree such questions is bound to produce overconfidence. Conof over/under confidence and the proportion of correct versely, the deliberate exclusion of difficult or surprising responses was .78. Further evidence that is inconsisitems is likely to produce underconfidence. tent with PMM has been reported by Ariely, ZauberFollowing May's lead, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and man, and Wallsten (1995) who concluded that ''subjects Kleinbölting (1991) have proposed a theory of probabidemonstrated overconfidence in both the perceptual listic mental models (PMM) that attributes overconfiand the knowledge domains under conditions in which dence to a biased selection of questions: ''If general (a) all statistical artifacts were ruled out, and (b) items knowledge questions were a representative sample (in the knowledge case) were randomly selected.'' from the knowledge domain, zero overconfidence will Evidently, the major (though not the sole) determinant be expected.... However, general knowledge questions of overconfidence is the difficulty of the questions, not typically are not representative samples from some dothe manner in which they are selected. Overconfidence main of knowledge, but are selected to be difficult or increases with item difficulty, both for random and noneven misleading . . . 'overconfidence bias' results as a random selection of questions, and we know of no eviconsequence of selection, not of some deficient mental dence showing that random sampling of questions reheuristics'' (Gigerenzer, 1993, p. 304) . The basic asduces overconfidence over and above the effect of item sumption of this theory is that the judge is properly difficulty. Although the deliberate selection of questions calibrated for any representative sample of questions, can produce spurious overconfidence, or anything else for easy or difficult, hence the only cause of overconfidence that matter, random sampling of questions is not suffiis a nonrepresentative selection of items. PMM makes cient to eliminate overconfidence, contrary to PMM. two bold predictions. First, it predicts that random Early assessments of the promise of this theory (Gigersampling of questions from a natural domain will elimienzer, 1993; McClelland & Bolger, 1994) should be renate overconfidence, regardless of item difficulty. Secvised in light of the failure of its two basic predictions. ond, it predicts that random sampling will eliminate Finally, the very notion of representative sampling of the hard-easy effect (Gigerenzer et al., 1991, p. 512) .
questions is highly problematic because it is unclear how Both predictions, however, turned out to be wrong.
to define the population of questions that constitutes a Recent studies have shown that for questions of modmeaningful knowledge domain. As suggested by Keren erate or high difficulty (say, where accuracy is below and Van Bolhuis (1994), the replacement of almanac 65%), overconfidence is consistently observed even questions with more natural tasks such as predicting the when the questions are randomly sampled from some stock market, the weather, or the outcomes of sporting natural domain of knowledge. Griffin and Tversky events, may offer a more promising approach for investi-(1992) selected at random pairs of states (e.g., Alagating people's confidence in their knowledge. It is notebama, Colorado) and asked subjects to indicate which worthy that overconfidence has been observed in some state is higher on some attribute (e.g., population), and natural prediction tasks in which item selection is not an to assess their confidence in each answer. These judg-issue. Examples include physicians' predictions of pneuments yielded significant overconfidence for all attri-monia (Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981) , econbutes, contrary to the first prediction of PMM. For ex-omists' quarterly forecasts of recession (Braun & Yaniv, ample, mean confidence for population questions was 1992), amateurs' predictions of bridge contracts (Keren, 75%, whereas the corresponding accuracy rate was 1987), or players' predictions of their opponents' moves 68%. Furthermore, overconfidence was more pro- (Griffin & Tversky, 1992 cali-Mulford, 1996) have noted correctly that plotting accuracy as a function of judged confidence (as is commonly brated, all five data sets in which accuracy did not ex-done in calibration studies) yields a different picture than knowledge, May (1987, 1988) , was the first to report that while average confidence commonly exceeds the that obtained by plotting judged confidence as a function of level of accuracy (whenever such data are available). percentage of correct responses, people's estimates of the relative frequency of items that they have answered Obviously, the two regression lines have different slopes. Consequently, these authors argue, the same data can correctly are generally lower than the actual number.
In her study of students' knowledge of psychology, the exhibit both overconfidence and underconfidence depending on whether judged confidence is the dependent percentage of correct responses was 72%, average confidence was 81%, and the mean estimate of the percentor the independent variable. We take issue with this interpretation. Although the two calibration curves may be age of correct responses was 63%. These data yield 9% overconfidence in judgment of probability and 9% unquite different, the question of whether average confidence exceeds average accuracy is independent of derconfidence in judgment of relative frequency. This pattern has been replicated in subsequent studies (e.g., whether accuracy is plotted as a function of confidence or vice-versa. Hence, the oldest and simplest measure of Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Sniezek, Paese, & Switzer, 1990) , although the degree of overconfidence-mean confidence minus overall accuracy-provides a valid criterion for diagnosing over/un-underconfidence varied considerably across studies.
These data indicate that people do not estimate the derconfidence that does not depend on the mode of analysis. If the same set of data appear overconfident in one frequency of correct responses by averaging their confidence across all items. However, the data do not ananalysis and underconfident in another, it is an indication that an inappropriate index of overconfidence (e.g., swer the question of whether the observed difference between the two tasks is due to the response scale (conthe slope of the regression line) has been used. The statistical models proposed by Erev et al. (1994;  see also Bren-fidence versus frequency), or to the nature of the evidence on which the judgment is based. The following ner, 1995; Juslin et al., 1995) , based on true score plus error, may help account for the distributional characteris-study explores this question.
To this end, we chose a task in which subjects can tics of the data, but they are not necessary to diagnose the presence or absence of overconfidence. make either confidence judgments or frequency estimates on the basis of the same evidence. One group of subjects (the target group) completed a personality Subjective Probability versus Relative Frequency inventory in which they (a) rated themselves on three A persistent objection to the calibration procedure con-bipolar personality dimensions, and (b) answered a cerns the meaningfulness of the comparison of average number of binary forced-choice questions regarding confidence to the percentage of correct answers. As one their behavior and preferences. A second group of subauthor put it, ''To compare the two means comparing jects (the prediction group) was given the target's perapples and oranges'' (Gigerenzer, 1991, p. 88). We do not sonality profile, and asked to predict the target's rewish to address here the psychological implications of sponses to the binary questions and to express their the debate between the frequentist and the subjectivist own confidence in these predictions. Half the subjects interpretations of probability. We only wish to point out in this group predicted the response of an individual that the subjects in calibration experiments are explicitly target, and the other half estimated the relative freinstructed to use the scale such that, say, 70% of the quency of the response among all target subjects who statements to which they assign 70% confidence will, in share a given personality profile. fact, be valid. In several experiments subjects were actuIf, as suggested by Gigerenzer (1991), cognitive illually paid according to this criterion. The lack of proper sions disappear when subjects assess relative frecalibration, therefore, indicates that, at the very least, quency instead of single-event confidence, we may exsubjects fail to use the scale as instructed. This failure pect overconfidence in the latter task but not in the has significant implications because the probability scale former. On the other hand, if subjects' confidence in is commonly used for communication. A client who is their predictions depends primarily on the degree to informed by her lawyer that her chances for winning the which the behaviors in question are representative of case are 99% may be justifiably upset to learn that when the target's personality profile (Kahneman & Tversky, the lawyer expresses a 99% confidence he is actually cor-1973), we expect both groups to exhibit overconfidence. rect only 75% of the time.
Aside from the normative question of whether aver-
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
age confidence should match the corresponding hit The Target Group rate, there is an interesting empirical question: what happens when people estimate relative frequencies in-
The target group consisted of 206 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Stanstead of single-event probabilities? To the best of our ford University. Each completed an approximately 30-lytic or Intuitive, and Adaptive or Decisive on the basis of whether their self-ratings on these dimensions were min personality inventory as part of a course requirement. Students were asked to rate themselves in terms above or below the group mean. The subjects were told that their task would be to predict, on the basis of the of three global personality dimensions adapted from the popular Myers-Briggs Lifetypes Inventory. All tar-personality profile, the responses of the target subjects to the rest of the personality inventory. get students rated themselves in terms of three bipolar dimensions defined as follows:
We selected two profiles for the prediction task: Extrovert, Intuitive, Decisive (EID) and Introvert, Ana-EXTROVERT-project energy outward; enjoy inter-lytic, Decisive (IAD). These were the two most common action with people, or profiles that differed on two out of the three dimen-INTROVERT-keep energy inside; enjoy solitude.
sions. Subjects predicted the responses for both person-ANALYTIC-prefer to act through a logical, step-ality profiles (IAD and EID) ; the order in which the by-step process, or two profiles were considered was counterbalanced. To INTUITIVE-prefer to act on inspiration or imagi-prevent confusion or forgetting, the profile being connation.
sidered appeared at the top of each page of the predic-ADAPTIVE-seek to adapt my life to changing cir-tion questionnaire. cumstances, or
Each prediction subject served in one of two condi-DECISIVE-seek to control my life, exerting my will tions. In the individual condition, subjects were asked on events.
to predict the responses of a single target subject. They were presented with a personality profile and were told For each dimension, the subjects checked one of six that it described a single individual, specified by iniboxes to indicate the extent to which one pole was a tials, who had been selected at random from all target better description of their personality than was the subjects with that profile. Prediction subjects then preother. We classified each subject in terms of one or the dicted the target's responses for all the questions of other pole based on whether the response fell above or the original inventory. Below each question was an 11-below the mean self-rating on that dimension. In this point scale (labeled ''Probability'') ranging from 50 to manner, every target was classified as Extrovert or In-100% in 5% intervals. Subjects circled a number inditrovert, as Analytic or Intuitive, and as Adaptive or cating their confidence, or subjective probability, that Decisive, yielding eight possible personality profiles. their prediction was correct (i.e., that the target person Subjects were then presented with 50 binary-choice actually chose the predicted option). questions involving dispositions, behavior, and preferIn the aggregate condition, respondents were asked ences (e.g., Are you often late for class? Yes/No; Do you to predict the percentage of target subjects of a given regularly make lists of things to be done? Yes/No; Do profile who chose a particular answer. For each quesyou enjoy gambling? Yes/No). The questions were setion, they first predicted the response chosen by the lected to span a wide range of activities and attitudes. majority of target subjects with a given profile (IAD or In addition, subjects were asked to choose between 28 EID). They then circled a number on the 11-point scale pairs of potential occupations (e.g., accountant versus (labeled ''Percentage'') ranging from 50 to 100% to indisocial worker; high school teacher versus high school cate their best estimate of the percentage of these tarprincipal). They were asked to indicate which of the gets who chose the option in question. two occupations better suited their personalities.
For example, given the profile Extrovert Intuitive Decisive and the item ''Do you enjoy gambling? Yes/
The Prediction Group
No,'' prediction subjects in the aggregate condition The prediction group consisted of 39 Stanford stu-were asked first to indicate whether the majority of dents recruited through an advertisement. They were EID targets responded ''Yes'' or ''No'' and then to estipaid $7 dollars for their participation in the experi-mate the size of this majority. Prediction subjects in ment, which lasted approximately 45 min. Prediction the individual condition were asked first to indicate subjects were first acquainted with the three major per-whether the particular randomly chosen EID target sonality dimensions used in the personality inventory. responded ''Yes'' or ''No'' and then to assess their confiThey were shown the same scales used by the Target dence in this prediction. Subjects, each pole of which was labeled with the appropriate term and description. They were told that Base Rate Estimates a large group of students from their university had completed the personality inventory and that each had
We also gathered estimates of the response base rates for all questions. Subjects in the base rate group been classified as either Introvert or Extrovert, Ana-were asked to estimate the overall percentage of their peer students that would choose a given alternative for each question, without any information regarding personality dimensions. Estimated base rates for each of the 50 questions were obtained from a group of 96 students enrolled in Introductory Psychology at Stanford University as part of a questionnaire packet handed out to the class. A different group of 39 Stanford students estimated base rate responses for the 28 occupational choices.
Representativeness Judgments
A separate group of 127 subjects were given the original personality inventory and were asked which of the two responses to each item was more representative of a given personality profile. Approximately half of the subjects evaluated the EID profile, and the remainder evaluated the IAD profile. For example, subjects were asked which profession, accountant or social worker, is more representative of the Extrovert, Intuitive, Decisive personality type. The percentage of subjects that selected each response is taken as a measure of the degree to which this response is representative of the Individual versus Aggregate Prediction respective profile. Thus, in addition to the targets' reSubjects in the individual condition (who assessed sponses, we obtained three types of data from different their confidence in the prediction of the response of a groups of subjects: predictions, base rate estimates, single individual) and subjects in the aggregate condiand representativeness judgments.
tion (who estimated the percentage of the predicted response in the target group) made essentially the RESULTS same judgments. Comparisons between the two groups on the 78 items yielded 8 significant differences (at a Diagnosticity of the Personality Dimensions Å .10) for the IAD profile and 10 significant differences To test whether the personality dimensions are pre-for the EID profile, which is very close to what is exdictive of the responses of the target group to the re-pected under the null hypothesis of no difference. mainder of the inventory, we computed the correlations Figure 1 presents the calibration curves for the two between each of the 78 items and each of the three conditions. (Since there were only a few estimates of binary personality dimensions. These values were sig-100%, they are not included in the graph.) As noted nificantly higher than expected by chance, 1 x 2 (78) Å above, there is practically no difference between judg-220, p õ .0001. The correlations were generally consis-ments of confidence in individual predictions and estitent with lay expectations. For example, most Extro-mates of relative frequency. Furthermore, both groups verts preferred to be with someone else when they are exhibited substantial overconfidence. Average confiupset, while most Introverts preferred to be alone. Peo-dence, across all items, was 72.1% whereas average ple who described themselves as Analytic were more accuracy was only 59.6%. The difference is highly siglikely to make lists and less likely to have an artistic nificant, t(36) Å 6.5, p õ .0001. As expected, accuracy hobby than people who described themselves as Intu-generally increases with judged confidence or relative itive. Decisive subjects more often indicated strongly frequency, but the relation is very weak. Because overheld political views and more often reported that they confidence is very much in evidence even in judgments found it difficult to admit their mistakes than did Adap-of relative frequency, it cannot be attributed to the native subjects.
ture of the required response.
Correlational Analysis
1 Each correlation was transformed using Fisher's z transforma- tween the mean responses in the four tasks, separately vice versa. Obviously, the two regression lines have different slopes (as noted by Erev et al., 1994) , reflecting the low correlation between the observed and for each profile. The results may be summarized as predicted proportions (r Å .22). The two regression follows. First, there is a moderate correlation between lines cross at the means of the two variables: mean the predictions and the target responses (.48 and .55), estimate, 72%; mean relative frequency, 56%. This disindicating that subjects were able to predict the targets' crepancy reveals substantial overconfidence, indepenresponses from the targets' personality profile with readent of the regression lines. Overconfidence is also sonable success. However, the fact that the targets' remanifested by the observation that mean estimates exsponses correlated even higher (.61 and .75) with the ceed the actual proportions in 87% of the items. In the estimated base rates (provided by a different group) absence of overconfidence, an equal number of items suggests that subjects did not make appropriate use of are expected to fall above or below the identity line. their own knowledge of this information. Thus, subjects could have achieved a higher predictive validity by ig-DISCUSSION noring the personality profile altogether and relying exclusively on their judgments of the relevant base
The results of the present study may be summarized rates. Obviously, combining both personality profile as follows. First, subjects were able to predict the tarand base rate could produce even better predictions. gets' responses from the targets' personality profiles Finally, subjects' predictions were highly correlated with modest success. Second, subjects who made confi-(.96 and .89) with the judgments of representativeness dence judgments concerning unique events and subobtained from a separate group of subjects. Taken together, these data are consistent with the notion that subjects made their predictions on the basis of the degree to which the target's potential response is representative of the relevant personality profile, with insufficient regard for the base rate of the response.
We have translated the personality inventory into Hebrew and replicated the study at Tel Aviv University, with minor procedural variations. In the Israeli version, each prediction subject (N Å 86) evaluated only one profile (EID or IAD) in the individual condition. The five most accurate subjects each received a $20 prize. The results were essentially the same. Mean confidence was 76.9% whereas mean accuracy was 56.7%, t(170) Å 31.7, p õ .0001. The correlations between the predictions and the target responses were .63 and .62, for IAD and EID respectively; the correlation between the target response and the estimated base rate were .63 and .75; and the correlations between the predictions and representativeness were .93 and .90.
Inverse Regression
Note that, in standard calibration studies involving the prediction of unique events, accuracy is plotted as REFERENCES jects who estimated relative frequencies produced essentially the same responses. Third, both confidence Alpert, M., & Raiffa, H. (1982) . A progress report on the training of judgments and frequency estimates exhibited substan- Koehler, Brenner, Liberman & Tversky, 1996) . on exactly the same evidence (i.e., a given personality Juslin, P. (1994) . The overconfidence phenomenon as a consequence profile), subjects made essentially the same judgments of informal experimenter-guided selection of almanac items. Orgain the two tasks. This is generally not the case in stud- Lovallo, 1993).
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In conclusion, it is evident that overconfidence is not Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. (1993) . Timid choices and bold foreeliminated by random selection of items, it does not casts: A cognitive perspective on risk taking. Management Science, 39, 17-31. disappear in estimates of relative frequency, and it can- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) . On the psychology of prediction. not be treated merely as a regression artifact. FurtherPsychological Review, 80, [237] [238] [239] [240] [241] [242] [243] [244] [245] [246] [247] [248] [249] [250] [251] more, comparable levels of overconfidence have been Keren, G. (1987) . Facing uncertainty in the game of bridge: A calibraobserved in studies of subjective probability distribution study. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Protions (see e.g., Alpert & Raiffa, 1982; Lichtenstein, cesses, 39, 98-114. Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982) , a task to which the above Keren, G. (1991) . Calibration and probability judgments: Conceptual objections do not apply. On the other hand, the interand methodological issues. Acta Psychologica, 77, 217-273. pretation of the overconfidence observed in calibration Keren, G., & Van Bolhuis, J. (1994) . On the ecological validity of experiments is complicated by the ubiquitous difficulty calibration studies. Unpublished manuscript, University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands. effect, which is as much a statistical as a psychological phenomenon.
